While I was on vacation, I missed a post by Sharon Hill on Skeptical Inquirer online. She recently re-shared the piece on Facebook, so I had an opportunity to give it a good read. Sharon’s pieces are usually filled with thoughtful reminders to reign in arrogance and do more than just tolerate other view points, embrace them and learn from them. I highly recommend following her regular columns there or at her blog, Doubtful News.

Is science hazardous?

This recent piece seems to be in response to the current discussion about the limits (and lack thereof) of science, such as this piece by Steven Pinker. However, it lacks the nuance I’ve seen in criticisms of Pinker’s piece.

Hill’s piece seems to define scientism, science, and several other terms somewhat vaguely, oversimplifying the issue and overcomplicating it at the same time. She begins the argument by claiming, if I may use an analogy, that there are many different ways to skin a cat, but then goes on to support that claim by pointing out that there are questions about whether the cat should be skinned, how much the process will cost, and whether the cat has a name. Answering these questions and skinning the cat are different tasks with different goals.

But it is this claim that I take the most issue with:

People who advocate fanatical reliance on science—where all competing methods of gaining knowledge are illegitimate—are practicing scientism.

This definition may very well put me in the category of “practicing scientism”, but it depends on what she means by “illegitimate”. While I recognize that personal knowledge can come from any number of methods and sources, respecting personal knowledge is not a reasonable stance when it comes to enacting policies and making choices which involve other people. To make the best choices, we need to rely on shared knowledge.

And I certainly do believe that empirical methods are necessary to gain genuine, reliable information about the world. In fact, that’s a basic assumption of science (more on that later).

The “just apply science” plan is an overly simplistic solution that not everyone will automatically buy into. There are other, also valid ways of evaluating problems. All the world’s problems cannot be solved by throwing science at it. At least not now (probably never).

This is a confusing statement with twists and turns.

First, whether or not “everyone will automatically buy into” a solution is no measure of the solution’s value.

Second, the statement about evaluating problems conflates the different tasks and goals associated with solving problems. Science, philosophy, and the humanities are different animals. To complicate matters, science incorporates philosophy and the humanities incorporate some scientific thinking. None of these things can tell us what to value, either.

For example, philosophy studies problems; it doesn’t solve them. Philosophy can only provide a way of thinking, not the information that one is to think about. Science, for that matter, doesn’t solve problems, either. It seeks and provides information and explanation. Technology solves problems, but it doesn’t do so just by thinking about them. Technology uses the products of science and scientific thinking (which includes products of philosophy) to solve problems.

So, this seems like a lot of apples and oranges and bananas to me.

The piece also contains more than a few straw men. For example:

For a start, scientism has utility problems. If we need to justify everything with empirical evidence, and then justify that evidence with evidence, and so on, not only do we get bogged down in minutiae, we end up in a scientistic loop which we can’t resolve. There must be a point where we accept a premise as a given – that reality is real, that we aren’t being fooled by a devious creator.

This is not only a straw man, it’s a misleading. Science does accept several premises as givens. In most college-level introductory science textbooks you can find these listed as “canons” or “assumptions”. For example, science assumes that the universe is deterministic, that all events have natural causes. Without this assumption, science can tell us nothing about the world with confidence because anything we observe might be explained by the supernatural.

So in a sense, the argument supports “scientism”.

Hill goes on to admonish over-enthusiasm for science because it “can mask the attention that should be paid to human social issues that are too complex…”, yet her examples are not issues too complex for science, but questions of policy which involve more than just information (e.g., one example involves the ethical question of whether to carry a fetus to full term knowing that it will be born with a debilitating condition). Science informs values, it doesn’t dictate them. However, values can’t answer those questions by themselves any more than science can.

Look at our laws. Many are informed by science (cigarette restrictions, driving after alcohol consumption, environmental regulations) but are tempered by other human interests such as personal pleasures, social norms and economic considerations.

Again, this seems a bit of a straw man. While there are those who claim that science can dictate values (which are embedded in each of those “human interests”), that is not a typical view and does not seem to be the view that Hill is railing against.

Science cannot tell us what we value or what we should value, but without scientifically-derived information and thought processes, we will fail to make choices and policies which promote those values.

Here is an example from my recent talks at TAM2013 and Dragon*Con, as covered in What Intelligence Tests Miss by Keith Stanovich:

In a study by Ubel, participants were asked to allocate 100 livers to 200 children who needed transplants. The children were presented in two groups: A and B. As you can imagine, most participants divided the livers equally, giving half to one group and half to another.

However, when the participants were told that the children in group A had an estimated 80% average chance of surviving the surgery, while the children in group B had only an estimated 20% average chance, the allocations varied much more. About one quarter of the participants gave all of the livers to group A, one quarter gave half to A and half to B, and half of the participants distributed the livers in a manner in between these two choices (i.e., one quarter gave 75 of the livers to group A and 25 to group B).

When asked why they gave livers to group B, participants justified their actions by saying things like “needy people deserve transplants, whatever their chance of survival.” This, of course, ignores the real question, which is how to allocate a limited number of livers to save the most lives. It tells us nothing about why the individual chose one child over another.

Participants in another study were given the same task except that the recipients were not grouped. Instead, they listed the recipients individually, ranked by the individual chance of survival. If the justifications were true, we would expect at least 25% of the participants to allocate the livers to every other child, or somewhat randomly down the list. Instead, participants had no problem allocating all of the livers to the top 100 children on the list.

The difference between the answers when the children are grouped and the answers when they are listed individually is called a “Framing Effect”. The way the problem is framed determines how a majority of the participants respond to it.

Now, science can’t tell us what’s “right” in this situation, but it can sure tell us how to meet our goals once we have decided what those goals are.

Let’s assume that our goal is to maximize the number of children who will be saved. Rational thought tells us that, given that goal and the choice of the two groups, we should give all of the livers to group A (science tells us that those are the children with the best chance for survival). The difference between that choice and the equal distribution is an expected 30 dead children.

It should be obvious from this example that considering our values and goals is not enough to make the best choices. We need good information and good thought processes to make the kinds of decisions that allow us to meet our goals.

One more statement that got under my skin:

When we overly indulge our science bias in informing decisions, such as in the realm of policy, the risk of making an unpopular guidance or rule increases.

Wait a minute. Is our goal to put the most popular policies in place or the best policies? For my part, I want policies that are best for society and the individuals within it. I don’t care if they are popular or not.

Science is not perfect or infallible, even when implemented correctly. Our knowledge is incomplete, which means that we will make a lot of mistakes when we take actions based on that limited knowledge. However, it will always beat human judgments in the long run, allowing us to make the best decisions and take the best actions toward our goals.

Works cited:

Stanovich, Keith E. (2009). What intelligence tests miss: The psychology of rational thought. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Ubel, P.A. (2000). Pricing life: Why it’s time for health care rationing. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Why do skeptics criticize Jenny McCarthy and Bill Maher?

Because they publicly trash mainstream science despite lacking the expertise to properly analyze methodology and draw different conclusions (how scientists do it).

Science uses peer review (not just “review”) to weed out bad studies, test the robustness of findings, and discuss appropriate conclusions. Peers are people who work in the same field – experts.

Scientists in related fields (or even completely different fields) are sometimes able to criticize the methodology of a given study, but big-picture stuff usually requires specific expertise. Non-scientist experts in a field of science are rare. VERY rare.

Pseudoscience and fraud are not science, so please don’t drag out the straw men and accuse me of claiming that only scientists can be good skeptics. I’m not. Think about the role that magicians have played in exposing so-called psychics, for example – the right tool for the job.

So, what am I trying to say here? Well, I’m trying to say that skeptics should criticize people who talk out of their asses about science on a public stage.

And I’m trying to say that skeptics should criticize it rather than do it themselves.

A skeptic, like anyone else, is entitled to make a mistake or two, even a big one. However, making a habit out of spouting one’s uneducated/under-educated opinion (or regurgitating one’s own interpretation of a cherry-picked opinion of an expert) from a stage is not what good skeptics do; it’s what people like McCarthy and Maher do. It shouldn’t be tolerated, much less encouraged.

But this has been discussed before:

http://www.skepticblog.org/2009/12/22/what-if-anything-can-skeptics-say-about-science/
http://www.randi.org/site/index.php/swift-blog/1338-need-advice-ask-an-expert.html
http://icbseverywhere.com/blog/2010/12/know-what-you-know/

For the record, there is NOTHING morally or ethically wrong with voicing one’s uneducated (or under-educated) opinion during private discussion or even in a public forum of equal footing. That’s called “discussion”.

This applies to both criticism and promotion, by the way.

Sometimes it is obvious where the line between pseudoscience and science is and sometimes it’s not. SkeptiCamps are a great place to get one’s feet wet and learn where those lines are, but I must warn you that even at these casual events, research-by-Google isn’t usually well-accepted. Do your homework if you’re planning to speak about pseudoscience.

And if you’re planning to talk about science, be very, very careful. Remember that reading a book or two, even if written by experts in the field, does not equate to the 10,000 hours of study required to gain expertise.

A note on why I wrote this:

There has been a lot of discussion about speaker lists in recent months.

I do not condone ultimatums or demands–attempts to bully organizations into punishing people you don’t like because you feel entitled to control. However, I have serious concerns about the quality of speakers at skeptic events and strongly believe that public discussion of the problems in general is needed.

These concerns are not new, but they have continued to grow and currently weigh very heavily on my mind.

So, sorry to be all judgmental and everything, but this stuff matters.

It seems that the best motivation for me (to write) is frustration.

A press release by UC Berkeley about a study that was recently published on the relationships among religiosity, compassion, and prosocial behavior has been making the rounds over the last couple of days, waved by proud atheists as evidence of superiority and bashed by the more skeptical as bad science (even though most haven’t appeared to have read the study). The latter has been exacerbated by the fact that the majority of reports include very big mistakes.

I’m going to analyze the study, but I will post that separately since it is likely to be long and I also want to discuss the incredible mess of BS this has become. In that post I will also discuss the reasons some of the errors that seem minor here are actually quite serious.

I blame the press release. Unfortunately, as the culture of higher education becomes more consumer-oriented, strapped-for-cash universities must market themselves strategically, and scientists are forced to compete for funding, the integrity of science is diminished. I don’t know if the study’s authors were involved, but my guess is that the press release’s author is mostly responsible for spinning the findings, omitting important parts of the findings, and cherry-picking statements by the scientists to make it appear that their speculative explanations for those findings are solid conclusions. I think that spin, along with the fact that the findings involve an interaction (a notoriously difficult concept to grasp due to its non-linear nature), confused science writers, many of whom are not in the practice of reading studies and many of whom added their own spin to the mix.

The study, published in the Journal of Social Psychological and Personality Science, is titled “My Brother’s Keeper? Compassion Predicts Generosity More Among Less Religious Individuals”.  The first error of the press release was made in its title: “Highly religious people are less motivated by compassion than are non-believers” by incorrectly describing the subjects of the study. It also errs in a few minor ways (e.g., describing the study as “three experiments” when one only one was experimental, one was analysis of existing data, and one was quasi experimental), but the biggest problems are practically criminal in the science world. The author correctly (with the exception of the description of the subjects) reported that the relationship between compassion and prosocial behavior was stronger among less religious participants than more religious participants, but omitted the findings which clearly showed that the more religious participants were, in general, more compassionate and generous overall.

When sloppy reporting took over, the result was an utter mess.

On the one hand, the authors claim in their introduction to be interested in what motivates less religious people to act prosocially, so perhaps the spin was the plan all along. However, if they were not interested in religiosity as a variable – if they were not interested in comparing the more religious to the less religious, then they should not have limited their study to the population of interest.

Something I found interesting is that the third paragraph of the press release makes a statement which should have sent red flags up because there was no follow-up that made sense. It started with:

The results challenge a widespread assumption that acts of generosity and charity are largely driven by feelings of empathy and compassion, researchers said.

And yet the rest of the piece focused on the fact that empathy and compassion DID drive generosity and charity in less religious participants, even if it repeatedly incorrectly referred to those participants as “non-believers”. If the author had included the findings that more religious participants were more generous, this would have made sense.

The author errs again with this circular definition of “compassion”, conflating the dictionary definitions of “compassion” and “prosocial behavior” with an effect:

Compassion is defined in the study as an emotion felt when people see the suffering of others which then motivates them to help, often at a personal risk or cost.

Compassion cannot be defined in a study as an emotion felt by someone. That’s a variable we can’t measure directly. In a study, we use operational definitions. In this case, compassion was defined differently in each of the three studies within the article.

The author continues the spin with statements such as (bold mine):

When they looked into how much compassion motivated participants to be charitable in such ways as giving money or food to a homeless person, non-believers and those who rated low in religiosity came out ahead: “These findings indicate that although compassion is associated with pro-sociality among both less religious and more religious individuals, this relationship is particularly robust for less religious individuals,” the study found.

What the bold suggests is that participants who fell into the “low religiosity” category were more prosocial and/or more compassionate. That’s not what the finding means. What was greater was simply the relationship between compassion and prosocial behavior. Because the “high religiosity” participants were more compassionate, they were also more prosocial overall (marginal significance – see discussion below).

Finally, this statement is grossly misleading:

Those who scored low on the religiosity scale, and high on momentary compassion, were more inclined to share their winnings with strangers than other participants in the study.

What participants do in a study is really not interesting. What their behavior tells us about how people behave in the world is. Because there was no statistical analysis comparing the “low-religiosity/high-momentary compassion” group to the other groups, this finding does not allow us to infer anything about the population of interest. You and I could complete a game of Scrabble with a final score of 102 to 103 (respectively), but I would not brag to my friends that I am the better Scrabble player.

Most reports of the study either posted the press release as-is or quoted large chunks of it. Headlines ranged from the simple and correct, if misleading, “Compassion may motivate faithful less” to the still incorrect, but closer “Confirmed: Atheists more motivated by compassion in charitable giving than believers are” to the blatantly incorrect statement suggested by, “Are Religious People Less Compassionate?”

Almost none of the reports describe the samples correctly. The samples were broken into two groups based on measured religiosity, a common practice in social psychology. Thus, there was a range of values and those who scored in the top half were considered “more religious” and the bottom half “less religious”. The “less religious” group cannot be described as “athiests”, “agnostics”, “non-believers”, or even “people low in religiosity”. The “more religious” group cannot be described as “highly religious”, either.

One site that I usually find more accurate contained a much more serious error than an incorrect sample description. It reported a finding not found in the press release that is actually the opposite of what was reported in the study:

Two other experiments also confirmed that more religious participants seemed to be less generous.

They should have stuck to quotes of the press release.

The worst by far, though was on a site called “PsychCentral“. The first paragraph reads:

A provocative new study from the University of California, Berkeley suggests highly religious individuals are less likely to help a stranger than less religious people.

Um. No. That’s not what the study suggests. At all.

and this a few paragraphs down:

Experts say the results challenge a widespread assumption that acts of generosity and charity are largely driven by feelings of empathy and compassion.

Why they added “experts say” to this is a mystery because it’s basically a lie, but this statement is particularly baffling when you consider that the progression of statements: 1) nonreligious are more generous 2) nonreligious are more motivated by compassion to be generous 3) results challenge the assumption that generosity is driven by compassion. On what planet does that make sense?

I’d lament that people don’t actually read, but the worst part is that someone actually wrote this. Sure, it’s mostly quotes and they made stuff up, but they changed some words and moved things around, so they had to pay attention to something.

A friend shared one decent report; it did not seem that the author read the journal article, but at least he read one report (on livescience.com) that is almost a duplication of the press release and put some thought into it. He noted that the findings reported an interaction – that generosity was more related to compassion among the less religious than it was among the more religious – and questioned who was more generous overall. If the press released had not omitted those findings, he would have had an answer, or at least a theoretically-likely hypothesis. Still, he did a little bit of research on his own and noted some well-known findings that the religious tend to give more to secular charities than atheists.

Finally, the press release included a few statements by the authors which were highly speculative. It is standard for authors to discuss possible explanations for their findings, but they are often presented to the public as conclusions the authors reached. In this case as in many others, reports of the study often imply that these things are findings when the study did not examine them at all. For example, the last paragraph of the press release is:

“Overall, this research suggests that although less religious people tend to be less trusted in the U.S., when feeling compassionate, they may actually be more inclined to help their fellow citizens than more religious people,” Willer said.

The rawstory.com report ended the same way, except they changed the last word to “concluded”. This statement serves as a hypothesis for another study, but it is not a finding of the study and cannot provide a conclusion.

I have heard a lot of explanations of what motivates more religious people, but most have been based on personal beliefs or experiences – duty to God, moral obligation, sense of community, etc.  This question may have been answered and looking to other studies might yield something, but this study does not address it – it did not set out to address that question.

A full analysis of the journal article will follow in a separate post later today.

UPDATE: Analysis can be found here.
ANOTHER UPDATE: The award for the most botched report now goes to MSN for this doosey.

First, if you have not read Parts I and II, please read them now. The most important parts of those posts are:

Arguments over scope and the conflation of atheism and skepticism have reached a fever pitch, as have arguments over tone. I will talk about some of this, but I will not attempt to explain all of the issues in any detail because everything that needs to be said has been said here and here and here and here and here and here and here and here and here… Well, you get the picture. In fact, if you want to argue the definition of skepticism or Skepticism* in the comments of this post, don’t bother. Instead, read what I wrote about it last year, which I would simply repeat in answer…

…I suggest is this: Skepticism*, as a movement, is not hindered so much by the conflation of atheism and skepticism, the ridicule of believers, or attempts to promote values-based ideology as it is hindered by the blatant ignorance, arrogance, and irrationality displayed when those acts are committed.

In a field dedicated to reducing ignorance and irrationality, a field in which arrogance is toxic, I find this kind of behavior offensive. It is time that we reclaim Skepticism and restore its credibility and integrity.

If one of the major goals of Skepticism is to educate, shouldn’t we all understand the material?

I am angry. I am angry and a little fearful for our future. We live in dangerous times and the work of Skepticism is serious. The work is hard. It requires patience, discipline, empathy, and knowledge.

I am angry because an influx of people who have stumbled upon or been recruited to the work of Skepticism are making it much more difficult. We’re moving backwards. This is happening, in part, because some of these rookies insist that their understanding of that work is as good or better than the understanding of people who have studied and worked in the field for years. Many have little or no education in the basics of science or the scientific process. Some claim to follow the teachings of people whose works they have never read. Some believe that the ‘old guard’ have more to learn from them than the other way around. These people voice their opinions on blogs and in talks, discussing topics about which they consider themselves competent after reading a couple of blog posts, listening to a podcast, considering their own limited experiences, or MAYBE reading a book or two on the topic.

What’s worse, they argue about details with little or no understanding of even the big picture. They believe that their understanding is complete and, therefore, requires no study, no thought beyond the surface features, and certainly not time or mentoring.

This is anti intellectualism in a field which promotes intellect and deep thought.

The problem has bothered me for some time and, in fact, ignorance of one’s own incompetence is something that bothered me in my classroom so much that I studied its relationship to academic entitlement, narcissism, external attributions for achievements, and study strategies. What we learned is that narcissism, entitlement, and shallow study strategies are strongly correlated with the Dunning-Kruger Effect, which is the phenomenon that the least competent people overestimate their competence the most as part of a self-serving bias. As relative competence increases, overestimations decrease, until the 75th to 95th percentile (depending on the domain), when estimates are fairly accurate. This is particularly problematic in an academic setting because the less students understand a concept, the more likely they are to believe that they understand it, the less likely they are to make changes to ensure that they learn it, and the more likely they will be to feel entitled to a high grade for their poor work.

Skeptical activism is not unlike academics.  Incompetence feeds on itself in this effect. The more an individual overestimates their competence, the more entitled they believe they are to an uncritical audience to which they can voice their opinions. What’s more, the more confident a blogger appears, the more their audience will reinforce their views (because they convince the audience that they know; the same thing occurs with eye witness testimony), although this is somewhat limited to situations in which the view is shallow enough to for the audience to understand, a perfect enhancement to the Dunning-Kruger Effect.

But high confidence is not an indication of actual understanding, nor is the number of supportive cheers of agreement from their followers.

The rest of this post will focus on one example of this, but there have been countless. This particular example is an especially egregious one, since she attacked both a friend for whom I have a great deal of respect and the field I defend daily. It was back-breaking straw for me.

When Amanda Marcotte whined that Daniel Loxton doesn’t want us to talk about religion, she built a now very familiar straw man and dressed him with inappropriate comparisons and other ignorant rambles. She appears to be upset because she somehow thinks that the usurping of a movement in motion, one which is founded on scientific principles, for the promotion of her personal political and religious ideology, should go unchallenged.

Amanda does not appear to understand what skepticism actually is or what science involves, yet she’s thrown her hat in, anyway. Perhaps she is insulted that somebody tried to tell her, I really don’t know, but I do know that the confidence with which she writes about the issues is unwarranted, a fact which is clearly demonstrated by the content of her post.

Amanda wrote,

“Look: atheism is the result of applying critical thinking and demands for evidence to the god hypothesis. It’s not any different than non-belief in all sorts of supernatural claims, such as ESP and ghosts. All of the weaseling around that is intellectually dishonest. It’s not about critical thinking, but about politics and frankly, not taking on religion because religion is seen as too powerful. “

Wrong.

What is intellectually dishonest is arguing about something you do not fully understand against people who are experts in the field. What is intellectually dishonest is advancing an uneducated opinion because the educated one does not help you achieve your own goals.

Her first two sentences demonstrate the problem with this entire post and most of the comments on it: ignorance. The rest of the paragraph is bullshit that Amanda made up. Nobody is ‘backing down’ and there is no concern that “religion is seen as too powerful”. This is not about politics. It is about scientific integrity.  This point has been made again and again, but ignored by people like  Amanda. Perhaps they ignore it because they do not understand it, or maybe they ignore it because it doesn’t help them, but the reasons don’t matter. Ignoring it won’t make it go away.

Science is the pursuit of truth. Truth is not value. Desires are not facts. Facts are not morals.

Scientific integrity requires adherence to scientific principles. Likewise, scientific skepticism relies on scientific integrity. Otherwise, we are just a bunch of people with opinions.

… Loxton decided to shit all over the work of people looking at improving gender, sexual oriention, class, and race diversity in the movement by complaining that the panel at The Amazing Meeting dedicated to this didn’t have any fucking Christians on it.

Again, she’s just making stuff up. Daniel noted that the diversity of the panel did not reflect the diversity of the audience in one important aspect. Framing this as “complaining that there were no Christians” is dishonest and the implication that Daniel does not care about issues of gender, class, and race is simply unfounded and abhorrent. Anyone who actually knows Daniel understands just how stupid that accusation is.

He firmly believes that the god hypothesis should be off-limits for skeptics, and that there should be a bright line between atheism and skepticism. This is ridiculous. “God” is a supernatural claim just like fairies and ghosts.

This statement, once again, not only demonstrates gross ignorance and shallow thinking, but the fact that she’s written an entire blog post questioning the knowledge of a professional skeptic on very basic definitions of the field without first educating herself is offensive and disrespectful. Had she even tried to understand the issues, a task which takes time and energy, she might have learned enough to at least recognize that she has a lot more to learn.

But I am clearly expecting too much, because Amanda thinks that “I don’t get it” equates to “It must not be true” as demonstrated by this parroting of Skeptical sound bites and bullet points, mostly taken out of context or misused (bold mine):

The excuse from “traditional” skeptics for making an exception for religion is that the god hypothesis is an untestable claim, and they’re only interested in testable claims. But as this fairy example shows, that’s not really true. There are plenty of things skeptics are skeptical about because of the preponderance-of-evidence standard. We don’t believe in ESP or ghosts or fairies because no one has ever produced solid evidence in favor of these things existing, and we combine that with an assumption that these things are highly unlikely and so the burden is on the people making the claims to prove them. I don’t see how god is any different.

… Yes, it’s true that you can’t test whether or not there is a god somewhere that simply refuses to show himself, but that’s also true of fairies, people with ESP, and ghosts. And yet it’s considered a good use of skeptical time to point out the weakness of the ghost/ESP argument. So why not god?”

She doesn’t ‘see it’, so it doesn’t exist. I hate to add to the sound bites when what is needed here is serious coursework, but there are some basic concepts that could help Amanda “see how” these things are different, starting with breaking down some of her giant straw man. Here are a few basic points that Amanda should have known before she wrote this post:

• Science is empirical, therefore scientific skepticism is empirical. This is more important than testability, although it is related. NOTE FOR THE RECORD: The concept of testability is watered down somewhat in my posts and comments because it is complicated. For a good discussion of these issues, I recommend Carl Sagan’s Demon-Haunted World.

• Skeptics do not “make exceptions” for religion. The fact that “God exists” is not an empirically testable hypothesis is not the fault of skeptics or Skepticism. It is the nature of the hypothesis. Science and skepticism have nothing to say about any hypothesis which can never be tested empirically.

• Skepticism is not a set of beliefs or conclusions. This is important. “We don’t believe in ESP or ghosts or fairies” is not something that a good skeptic would say and the ‘we’ part is presumptuous. I certainly do not want someone like Amanda Marcotte speaking for me if this what she thinks skepticism is.

• What any Skeptic believes is irrelevant. Personal knowledge is derived in whatever way the individual chooses to derive it. Science and skepticism deal with shared knowledge. Shared knowledge requires empirical evidence.

• The reason that we can easily discount ESP in most cases is because it is usually easily tested empirically.

• Requiring empirical testability is not “giving religion a pass”. It is holding true to the scientific process, which is designed specifically to ensure that our human biases and personal values do not affect our ability to distinguish what is true from what is not true. Religion’s most basic claims usually involve an omniscient and omnipotent being, making them largely untestable. This is not at all true of ESP, ghosts, or other traditional topics in skepticism. More on that below.

• A good skeptic would never state that there are no ghosts. A good skeptic would investigate specific claims of hauntings, searching for natural phenomenon which would explain the evidence. A good skeptic would not say there is no such thing as extrasensory perception. A good skeptic would say that we have no evidence to support precognition, telekinesis, etc.

• Skepticism is not about pointing out the weaknesses of arguments. It is about evaluating the evidence. These are not even close to being the same. When a self-proclaimed psychic moves the bar and says, “If it failed the test, then the forces that give me these powers do not want to be seen,” they make their claim untestable. Skeptics then have nothing to say in response. However, skeptics can provide natural explanations for phenomena (e.g., reveal that Peter Popoff was being fed information via an ear piece) which are much more parsimonious than supernatural explanations. This is also what we do with religious claims. If someone claims that God created man as he is today, we can point to the evidence which support the theory of evolution. If they claim that God created the universe, we can point to the evidence for the Big Bang. If they claim that God created the universe and man by making these natural processes possible, well then, we cannot refute that.

But Amanda would like to cast out Pamela Gay because Pamela believes in a personal God. Never mind the fact that she has never tried to sell that view to others, that she never claimed to support it with evidence, or that she is a very competent and knowledgeable Skeptic, scientist, science educator, and science communicator. Nevermind that Pamela Gay is a valued member of the Skeptical community who has done more to educate and excite young minds about science than all but a few others. [NOTE: minor edit for clarity, 08/07/11 9:50am]

Pamela Gay is not being irrational. Amanda Marcotte is.

Marcotte’s diet example is another case of irrelevant comparison. She states, sarcastically, that people are also touchy about their diet and so expressing skepticism about food trends is probably bad idea, too. This is clearly a straw man. We can demonstrate the effects of gluten empirically, so it is a poor comparison, too. Nobody is saying that people should not express skepticism about the existence of a God. What we are saying is that we cannot demonstrate empirically that God does not exist, therefore, if that is your conclusion, you cannot share that conclusion with others. The difference between personal knowledge and shared knowledge is not trivial.

Making others comfortable is not the issue, either, although making people uncomfortable out of arrogance and ignorance is certainly a part of the issue. I would like to point out that Amanda’s double-standard is pretty obvious in that paragraph. Apparently, the needs that matter are the needs of those she thinks deserve our attention and that’s it. But while we’re on the subject, it doesn’t matter if you are promoting skepticism, atheism, or your favorite restaurant. Being an asshole is being an asshole. The reason that DBAD matters to the rest of us is that when a dick represents Skepticism, they make our jobs more difficult.

The issue of scope is more complicated than the atheism/skepticism debate. The only reason that religion is given special consideration in the discussions of scope is that there are more people conflating atheism with skepticism than ever before. There are more people acting like superior assholes than ever before. People who could be helped by skeptical outreach as well as people who contribute a great deal to the movement (people like Hal Bidlack, a brilliant, scholarly, honorable man with years of service to the community) have been run off by the relentless arrogance of people like those I have discussed in this series of posts. The ignorant, the arrogant, and the irrational (I’m picturing monkeys of the ‘no evil’ variety, but with interesting facial expressions).

And this problem is growing.

Most of the comments on Amanda’s post demonstrate a frenzied groupthink that will further convince her that she’s on the right track. Comment number 41 describes this problem (among others) quite well: “One cool thing about having a political blog which is allegedly powered by skepticism is that people will be much more tolerant of logical fallacies.”

Some of the most fallacious comments:

…There’s nothing worse than an agnostic who thinks he’s more logical and skeptical than an openly religious person. Whether you’re an agnostic or a believer you’re engaging in special pleading on the god question, subjecting it to a different standard than any other question of existence, and you are not a skeptic nor are you logical.

“Special pleading” is a straw man that is repeated often. But it is just that: a straw man.

what the hell is skepticism for if not doing away with false beliefs?

More ignorance. There is no such thing as a ‘false belief’. Beliefs are simply what you hold to be true. Nobody actually knows for certain what is true. Skepticism is about evaluating evidence, period.

H0: There is no god. H1: There is a god. There is a serious shortage of evidence for H1, therefore we must accept the null hypothesis.

Introductory statistics cannot address the question of whether or not God exists.

If there’s a lack of humanpower and ressources to do everything, the question skeptics organizations should ask themselves is not why they should get involved in the more political aspects of skepticism, but why they should still waste ressources on the trivial, non-political aspects like Bigfoot/UFO/ghost/cryptozoology debunkings and such.

Wow. This is very disturbing, and I’m not just talking about the spelling or misuse of words like “aspects”. Apparently many commenters don’t watch television or get out of the house much. The number of shows devoted to ghost hunting alone is staggering. Then there are the shows about psychics of all ages, animal mind readers, monster hunting, etc. These shows are appearing on channels once devoted to science, for FSM’s sake. As for why we don’t get involved in politics, read this.

And anyone who is interested in the bigger picture – the picture concerned about meeting the goals of the movement – should read Comment number 75 on Amanda’s post.

The parroting that atheism is the result of applied skepticism that is so prevalent in the comments and stated in Amanda’s post is anti-skeptical. It demonstrates a failure to understand the fundamental process of skepticism and the empirical nature of science and scientific skepticism. The definitions of science and scientific skepticism were arrived at through centuries of study, collaboration, contemplation, and discussion. They are not negotiable, at least not without agreement from a vast majority of scientists.  If you cannot accept these definitions as they are, you have three choices:

1. Publish your opinions in peer-reviewed journals and hope that philosophers and scientists agree with you.
2. Keep arguing about it with Skeptics and impede our progress.
3. Go do something else.

*”Big-S Skepticism” refers to the work of the skepticism movement in promoting the practice of skepticism.

In my mini-review of The Amazing Meeting 8 I mentioned that there were two very dark spots in an otherwise amazing (sometimes the word just fits) weekend.

I was not ready to discuss these in detail, but when I stumbled over this blog post by Blag Hag Jen McCreight, I felt that at least one should be discussed and I would like to do so through the filter of one of the best talks of the weekend, given by Massimo Pigliucci.

McCreight addresses the question of sexism, saying:

The one annoying thing I saw was the perpetuation of the Sexy vs. Smart binary in talks.

I saw none of this in talks. She gives two examples: Michael Shermer’s talk included a Los Angeles County Fair commercial from a series which has been shown for several years now.

This series is meant to portray a stereotype of geography, not the attractiveness (or the gender; they could have easily used the dumb surfer boy image) of the actors. I can understand this getting past much of the audience. Those of us who live in southern California and have seen the entire series likely take it for granted.

That said, the video seemed to have little to do with the rest of his talk and seemed a bit too “look at these dumb people”; I cringed myself when I saw it. So this is probably worthy of discussion, but I do not think it is a strong example of associating appearance with intelligence.

McCreight also accuses SkepDoc Harriet Hall of sexism:

Whenever she mentioned Jenny McCarthy in her talk as an example of someone saying something stupid (which Jenny McCarthy certainly does often), she would include a picture of her bending over in a bikini or some other scantily clad outfit. Why was this effective? Why not use a photo of Jenny McCarthy in a suit?

Why is it sexist for Harriet Hall to show Jenny McCarthy, a former model and Playboy bunny, in a swimsuit rather than something more modest? If McCarthy were, say, a cashier by trade, the image of her in a cashier’s smock would have been just as appropriate, no?

The purpose of the images was to show that frightened parents will favor the message of someone entirely unqualified to give medical advice over their MD. McCarthy is qualified to have her picture taken and did so “scantily clad” for years.

McCreight also repeated something central to her own talk (which I am not ready to review in its entirety):

The stereotype goes that women can sexy/attractive/beautiful and stupid/ditsy/unscientific, or they can be smart/witty/scientific and frumpy/plain/ugly. This myth annoys the hell out of me, especially because it’s so common.

This is where I put on my “Massimo” glasses and discuss expertise.

Media stereotypes are not “myths”. In fact, they do not necessarily reflect what individuals in society actually believe. These definitions are important, especially when one’s argument relies on them. When you make statements about one thing (media portrayals), but you are really talking about something else (behaviors and attitudes), you need to prepared to cite sources which clearly show that these are interchangeable; the distinction matters.

The truth is that attractive persons are more likely to be associated with an occupation that is held in high regard, including scientist, than less attractive persons. That’s the halo effect. It is very well-established in the psychological literature and not limited to men or even human beings.

Some of the points Jen made are valid criticisms, but the valid criticisms are overshadowed by vague, uninformed statements. Many of the points rely on whether her general claims of “this is what people think” are accurate. She does not cite sources which show that she knows “what people think”, nor is her background in psychology or a related field, which might provide some evidence of expertise in this area.

“I’ve seen it” is not evidence, something a young scientist in training (and many older, experienced ones) must constantly remind themselves in order to overcome our brain’s desire to think that it is.

McCreight defended TAM organizers by repeating a statement made many times by Jeff Wagg about speakers at TAM7:

Last year, 8 women were invited to speak at TAM. 2 said yes. 1 of those women had to cancel.

I have never heard Jeff compare this with the number of men who were invited and how many of those accepted or canceled. Without that comparison, this information tells us nothing.

Frankly, however, I care much more about the quality of the speakers than their gender, but given the number of high-quality speakers available who are women and the ratio seen at other events, the lopsidedness at TAM in past years was a bit disturbing. I thought they did a great job all around this year and didn’t need to be defended.

I thought the sex workshop was on Sunday…

Regarding the “Feminism & Skepticism Workshop”, although I am not the person she quoted, I was sitting directly behind McCreight and walked out when “Angry Vagina Craft Time” was announced.

My take? There are three criteria which should have been met for a topic or activity to be included in this workshop:

1. It is a feminism issue.
2. It is a skepticism issue.
3. The discussion is well-researched and well reasoned.

Although there were definitely some good points, much of what was discussed prior to “Angry Vagina Craft Time” failed to meet one or more of these criteria, especially #3.

Asking people to make vaginas (term used loosely) out of felt and googlie eyes did not make me uncomfortable, but infantilizing women’s genitalia and calling it “light humor” made me a bit angry – yes, I had an angry vagina. And an angry jaw. It could have made many women very uncomfortable, yet it served no purpose that I could see short of a “fuck you” to those who have criticized the workshop’s organizers in the past for such things.

I left because I had seen enough.

Overall, in regard to sexism at TAM8, I thought this year was a huge improvement over last. I attribute this largely to a different mix of attendees. I really wish that friends who were turned off by the culture last year could have experienced it. Perhaps they would see the community differently.

To sum up my experiences and in answer to McCreight’s questions: There were exactly two times during the weekend when I was offended. That workshop was one of them. Ironic, isn’t it?

Cross-posted at Woo Fighters

St. Francis Xavier University, Antigonish, Nova Scotia

A couple of days ago I read something that I found very disturbing and I was reminded of it today. It illustrates the challenge we have in educating the public about science and, perhaps, why it is so challenging. There must be an idiom which fits. Perhaps you have some suggestions.

So, first I will tell you what I read, then I will tell you why it was more disturbing than what I commonly encounter. If you want to skim, I cannot stop you, but please scroll down to the bottom for the shocker.

The offending paragraph was found in a review of Daniel Loxton’s wonderful children’s book, Evolution: How We and All Living Things Came to Be which appeared in CM Magazine, a publication of the Manitoba Library Association.

Although the text is very good in describing the theory of Evolution, there are points in the book where the author makes comments that could imply that Evolution is more than a theory. For example, “…Charles Darwin revealed the solution to the mystery of evolution” (p. 7). He also makes the comment that Evolution is the most important idea in all of biology (p. 7). Such phrases may lead the reader into thinking that scientists completely understand the theory of Evolution which would be incorrect, else Evolution would be a principle or a law and not a theory. As well, it is a bit bold to claim that evolution is the most important idea in all of biology – biology is a huge field of study with other key discoveries.

This text could be read by a young reader for ‘fun.’…

First, let me address this criticism because it is a common one made by evolution deniers and because it preys on a misunderstanding of science that many laypeople have.

As with most words in the English language, the word “theory” has multiple meanings. In general use among non-scientists, it is often used to express “conjecture”, “speculation”, or some other unproven or untested guess.

None of those definitions are what a scientist means when they use the term “theory”.

Neither a “principle” nor a “law” is a theory which is “completely understood”, either. Laws are simple statements which describe, not explain.

The descriptions given by Dr. Genie Scott, Executive Director of the National Center for Science Education, of the definitions of fact, law, hypothesis, and theory. It occurs about 3:50 into the video.

Theories vary in strength from very weak to very strong. The theory of evolution through natural selection has withstood 150 years of rigorous testing. It is one of the strongest theories in science.

And, yes, it is, by far, the most important idea in biology. It is probably the most important in all of the life sciences including behavioral sciences like psychology. Of course, this is a statement of opinion and I am not a biologist. However, I cannot imagine a biologist of any quality who does hold this opinion. I offer as evidence the words of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, whom Theodosius Dobzhansky quoted in his 1973 essay in American Biology Teacher titled “Nothing in Biology Makes Sense Except in Light of Evolution“:

(Evolution) is a general postulate to which all theories, all hypotheses, all systems must henceforward bow and which they must satisfy in order to be thinkable and true. Evolution is a light which illuminates all facts, a trajectory which all lines of thought must follow — this is what evolution is.

So, to summarize so far, a theory is an explanation – it is a set of testable and tested statements about relationships among variables which explains a given phenomenon. Ideas are not called “theories” because we do not know if they hold true. The strength of a theory depends on the quantity of observable facts explained, the quality of the explanation, the amount of testing it has withstood, and many other factors.

Evolution is an amazingly strong theory.

The author of the review does not understand the term “theory” as it is used in science, nor does she understand “law” and “principle”. Although these are often misunderstood by laypersons, they are fundamental to science. They are the language of science.

What is so shocking?

The review was written by an Assistant Professor of Science Education.

Katarin MacLeod is an Assistant Professor in Science Education at St. Francis Xavier University in Antigonish, NS. Her areas of interest include physics educational research (PER), and the incorporation of science, technology, society and environment (STSE) outcomes into science courses at all levels to help students understand the relevancy of science, increase scientific literacy, and to promote citizenship.

That, my friends, is disgraceful.

Each semester I teach at least one course with a co-requisite laboratory course in which students conduct psychological research in small groups. Due to certain requirements of the American Psychological Association, these studies are not eligible for publication in an approved journal. Although students sometimes meet the requirements and re-run these studies in order to present or publish the findings, the original studies are considered pilot studies.

Some of these studies are very well-designed and executed and the findings are often interesting new discoveries. So, I have decided that it is about time I shared some of them and I will begin today with a timely finding about impression formation.

This semester, Brittany Reid, Lisa Aguilar, and Nare Setyan were interested in factors involved in judgments of intelligence and credibility as applied to marketing and image management. Specifically, they wondered if a hedonistic culture (party attitude) promoted by a group resulted in lower judgments of intelligence and credibility than traditional cultures. In other words, if you advertise that you like to party, will people think that you are less intelligent?
There is very little in the scientific literature regarding the assumptions people make about the relationship between hedonic behavior and intelligence. In fact, we could find none. There are mixed findings regarding the factors involved in judgments of intelligence. Most find that men are judged more intelligent than women, although no practical sex differences exist in general measures. Some studies have found that unattractive men are judged as more intelligent than attractive men and that the reverse is true for women. Many studies have found the opposite. Some have even suggested that attractive people are judged as more intelligent than unattractive people because they are more intelligent.

One club, two websites: a traditional academic site (left) and one which emphasizes a 'party' attitude (right)

We know that the way people dress, the number of piercings, the number of tattoos and all sorts of other things affect our judgments of people’s intelligence, competence, and a host of other attributes. The truth is, in the absence of other information and in some cases even when explicit information (e.g., about intelligence) is provided, appearances matter. So what about behavior? How does that affect the impressions people form of others?

The researchers hypothesized that the creators of a hedonistic (party attitude) group are judged as less intelligent and less credible than those of a traditional group. To test this hypothesis, they created two websites for a university psychology club.

Appeared on the home page of both versions.

• The main photo on the front page was clearly taken at a party whereas the main photo on the traditional front page was a group of students.
• The “spring break” photo gallery contained photos of parties and women in bikinis and people drinking at parties. The same gallery on the traditional site contained photos of students building houses for a charity. The events galleries included similar, but more subtle differences in the activities depicted.
• The executive board’s biographies focused on casual attributes whereas the traditional board’s bios discussed science.

Participants (28 of them; the responses of men and women did not differ in any of the measures) were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions. They were instructed to study the website for 5 minutes and that they would be asked to remember it later. Afterward, they navigated away from the website and completed a survey about the site. They were asked to indicate the degree to which they agreed with each of 10 statements using a 5-point Likert scale. The statements were:

• There should be more sites of this nature.
• This website promotes education.
• I would visit this website again.
• This website promotes “a good time”.
• I would recommend this site to others.
• I trust this site for credible information.
• The creator of this website is intelligent.
• This site is boring.
• I would view this site in my own time.
• I learned something new from viewing this website.

I will not bore you with the statistical output, but for those interested, I will note the following: The hypotheses were tested though independent samples t-tests comparing the judgments for numbers 6 and 7, then responses to all questions were also compared. The additional analysis is exploratory, but adjustments to alpha would only change the outcome of #10, which resulted in a p-value of .01. All other p-values are less than or equal to .001.

The findings are best illustrated by listing the agreements which did and did not differ among the groups. Tests of the research hypotheses appear in bold. The largest difference was in responses to question number 1:

So, the presence of a ‘party attitude’ did not affect evaluations of the site itself. The traditional site was not considered more boring and participants were no less likely to visit it than the ‘party’ site. Surprisingly, agreement on whether the sites promote ‘a good time’ did not differ, either.

However, the traditional site produced higher ratings of education promotion and participants were more likely to say they learned something from it. Participants were more likely to recommend the site to others and feel that more sites of its nature should exist.

Most importantly, however, are the research hypotheses themselves, which address the views that participants held about the website’s creators and the credibility of the information on the site. Clearly, the creators of the ‘party attitude’ site were judged as less intelligent than the creators of the traditional site. Of course the reasons for this are not clear in this study. Participants may not have felt that people who party are less intelligent, but rather that people who chose to emphasize this behavior on a site promoting an academic (and science-related) club were less intelligent. This is a testable hypothesis, just not tested here.

What is most concerning for this context, however, is the difference in credibility. The purpose of the club as described on the websites is, “To encourage professional activity and involvement.” The goal is not to form a social club. Of course the images of partying are not contradictory (even on the traditional site, the images involve groups having fun), but they do not promote the cause. These seemingly unrelated endeavors (academic and hedonic) appear to mix like oil and water and for a university club wishing to promote a scientific field, credibility is vital.

There are some things to keep in mind when drawing conclusions from these findings. Some of these strengthen the argument, some are limiting:

• Participants only viewed one website. They did not compare the websites side-by-side. This is a strength as participants were given no clues to the purpose of the experiment.
• This was a true experiment and, therefore, causal conclusions are reasonable.
• Everything is relative and when we discuss scientific findings, we are always talking about comparisons. A medication works relative to no medication. A teaching method is better than a different method. In this case, the traditional academic website is compared to one in which relatively more images and verbiage referred to leisure social interactions (parties).
• The participants were college students in a science field. The proportion planning to work in the field is probably a minority (it changes) and the proportion planning a career in research is very small. Many students major in psychology without awareness of the scientific rigor required for a degree. Still, the participants of this study have been trained in research methods and there is some reason to think that they may care more about science and academics than the general public. I am not sure this fact is important when considering the implications, but it may be.
• There were some mistakes which resulted in unintended differences between the websites. For example, on one, the biographies are aligned vertically and on the other, one is offset to the right. There is a link to the calendar at the top of one and not the other. The gallery links are in a different order. I agree with the researchers that there is no reason to think that any of these minor differences affected the results.

That just about sums up the experiment. I leave it to you to decide what these findings suggests about impression formation and management in other pursuits and fields. Certainly they are not generalizable to every situation, but they do provide food for thought.

This post may sound condescending and perhaps it is. Self-righteousness is not my intention, but I am well aware that some may see it differently. The alternative is to keep my mouth shut and pretend that all is well.

All is not well.

I have been very disturbed by something that I have seen far too much of in the community recently. It is not new, but it was very salient right now and it broke my heart.

I feel that I must also acknowledge the fact that behavior in some arenas has left me angry, outraged, and even queasy. But this post is about skeptics and skepticism.

You see, it is obvious that an uncomfortably large portion of people calling themselves skeptics and skepticism activists and advocates are under the impression that the definition of “skepticism” is one or more of the following:

• liberalism
• humanism
• secularism
• atheism
• negotiable
• a refuge for people who felt like outcasts in high school

Following are some quotes which led me to this conclusion. I will not provide the names (I’m sure Google will help you with that if you must know) because none of them are unique. Each has been stated by at least one other person, although perhaps not in the same words. And some of these go back a few months.

I was under the impression that Skepticism was about questioning norms and creating change.

It’s [skepticism] not an either/or scenario (social justice movement OR tool), it’s whatever you want it to be.

Skepticism means something different to all of us.

Then you are using Skepticism as a social movement.

I will say this again because it is important enough to repeat: this is heartbreaking.

This is heartbreaking because it means that the movement has succeeded in attracting people who are willing to identify themselves as skeptics, but it has failed miserably in its cause: promoting skepticism. A friend whose interaction with the community is minimal summed it up nicely: The price of widespread acceptance is widespread ignorance.

The scope of skepticism and the line between atheism and skepticism have been discussed at length by many people who clearly understand the issues. There are philosophical and historical arguments which, settled or not, tend to be central in rational discussions of the topic.

It is not these arguments that prompted me to write this entry. It is not the people making these arguments who worry me.

It is the people who have either forgotten or never knew that skepticism is about epistemology; it is about how we know. I would like to think that people devoting their time and energy to a cause want to understand what it is they are working toward.

First, let’s establish that I didn’t make this up.

UK Skeptics:

Skepticism is an honest search for knowledge. It is an approach to claims akin to the scientific method. It is a powerful and positive methodology (a collection of methods of inquiry) that is used to evaluate claims and make decisions. It is used to search for the (provisional) truth in matters and to make decisions that are based on sound reasoning, logic, and evidence.

Suite 101

Skepticism, a form of evidence-based reasoning, is a way of knowing that weighs evidence and prior plausibility in determining if a claim is true… Skepticism is not a religion or life philosophy. It tells a person not what to think, but how to know. Skepticism provides time-tested tools used long in science and academia that give the best possibility of finding the truth.

Radio Freethinker

Skepticism is about the search for knowledge. Its foundations are the scientific method and relying on empirical evidence. Skepticism is the process of applying critical thinking, reason, and reality to a given matter. A skeptic is someone who applies vigorous and systematic research to any claim, regardless of its political, religious, or social implications…
Skepticism is not a belief system. Skepticism is a methodology.

Drinking Skeptically

Skepticism is a method of examining claims about the world. The skeptical “toolbox” includes a reliance upon reason, critical thinking, and a desire for verifiable, testable evidence about particular claims (especially extraordinary ones). Usually, the “skeptical way of thinking” is embodied in the scientific method.

You may redefine the word if you like, but then you are just making stuff up.

Notice that all of these definitions describe a process, not a conclusion. They describe a search for truth, not a search for values. In fact, there is a clear and very scientific statement that values are irrelevant: “A skeptic is someone who applies vigorous and systematic research to any claim, regardless of its political, religious, or social implications.”

While it is certainly the case that a large portion of the community supports socially liberal ideals, the promotion of those values is not skepticism.

What’s more, the promotion of values cannot be included in this pursuit.

Why are values and morals outside the scope of skepticism or science? Because they make us biased.

The most influential factor in evaluating arguments is something called the belief bias. Look it up.

Bias is not always a bad thing when we are making decisions about actions to take, such as whether we should donate to a cause or take in an animal that needs a home, but bias is our worst enemy when we are looking for truth. Biases lead us to misinterpret, misattribute, and misunderstand. They lead to mistakes. They are the reason we need science in the first place.

So, let me summarize this:

Skeptics assert that the scientific method is the best means for both acquiring knowledge and for testing claims. By definition, the scientific method is one in which we minimize human error by removing human biases from the process. This drastically reduces the probability that we will draw the wrong conclusion.

The skepticism movement is an organized effort to apply scientific skepticism to claims, thereby reducing the harm that belief in those claims causes. We apply skepticism to determine what is true. We use that information to reduce the dissemination of untruths.

Truth is not value and facts are not morals.

Furthermore, if you refuse to set aside your values and morals when considering whether something is true, by definition, you are not rational.

In my opinion, if you do not understand the fundamental concept that personal values and opinions may be informed by scientific inquiry, but cannot be considered in the methods that are science and skepticism, then you are not a skeptic.