http://tinyurl.com/c8k3tlk

And you’re right. He (Myers) does argue like a creationist.

I would have thought that in the search for truth a critical to and fro would be welcome.

It is, but you’d framed it as an argument when I saw only agreement.

I do not think that we can decide what is true other than as a critical preference; a less wrong option.

Agreed, and I often note that I don’t think the word “truth” has a place in skepticism, so my choice of words here is poor.

In detail (a simplified version of what you wrote), science’s ultimate goal is truth, but it recognizes that such a thing is not entirely possible. So, when I say that we use X to decide what is “true”, I refer to the goal. It’s a shorthand that I really should try to reword.

Not ad hominem at all.

Part of the reason for the dogmatic drift in the skeptic movement is a subtle philosophical under-pinning of justificationism or foundationalism.

I would have thought that in the search for truth a critical to and fro would be welcome.

You did post as a “core” statement: “At the core of scientific skepticism is the view that evidence-based reasoning is the best way to decide what is and is not true. Furthermore, the only legitimate way to acquire evidence is through the scientific method, which is basically a combination of systematic observation (empiricism) and reason. Therefore, scientific skepticism involves using the scientific method to test claims.”

I do not think that we can decide what is true other than as a critical preference; a less wrong option.

We can acquire evidence or inspiration from all sorts of places… no method necessary.

I agree that scientific skepticism involves testing claims and using critical analysis.

The goal of science is problem solving and good explanations, and of course we would like them to be true.

A more careful read might clarify things and show that you’re not arguing with me. You’re expanding on what I wrote. I don’t think that what I wrote is misleading at all. It’s a summary, with suggested reading for detailed explanations.

Joe Barnhart’s Clifford quote is in the context of demolishing the logical empiricist definition of knowledge as “justified true belief”.

There is no scientific method other than being vigilant to make all claims open to refutation by evidence. There is no clock-work mechanism to produce explanations, they can come from a dream, a conversation, a worrying problem, a cup of coffee, a fantasy, a poem and even an observation or many such. These explanations are guesses, albeit often very sophisticated guesses. Dressing up guesses as some sort of fail-safe logical procedure has filled more library books than were lost in the library of Alexandria.

The trouble is that the dogmatic “justified true belief” flavour that drifts into a lot of sceptical proselyting alienates the very audience that it is trying to reach – unless of course it, like other faiths, it is content to preach to the converted.

In my view, which is strongly critical rationalist in flavour, all of us are wrong but sometimes less so than others. Even when we are right we cannot be certain. That is science, and in my view it is empirical skepticism.

Empirical skepticism admits the POSSIBILITY of knowledge as conjectured concerning problems, evidence and so forth while also accepting that new evidence MAY overturn any claim.

Creationism is not science because its proponents tend to collect evidence only to justify it and they consistently wriggle out of making their claims falsifiable. Being falsifiable means being stated in such a way that evidence, if found, could refute it.

Futhermore, Karl Popper replaces the problem “How do you know? What is the reason or justification, for your assertion?” by the problem: “Why do you prefer this conjecture to competing conjectures? What is the reason for your preference?” One might consider internal consistency in comparing conclusions, investigations of the logical forms of theories, comparing theories with other theories to determine whether or not the theory under consideration is a scientific advance, and empirical applications of the conclusions.

Critical preference is critical, not justification of beliefs.

In this context what does “wrong” mean? It seems, on the one hand, to mean moralistic (bad boy, bad boy!) or does it mean only not correct? Hopefully he didn’t stoop to moralism, but not correct hardly works, either. Often people believe something that turns out to be true based on the flimsiest of reasons. (Most of us believe Jupiter is bigger than Saturn although virtually no one has any evidence. The most compelling reason I can think of is, why would astronomy authors choose to lie?). Am I “wrong” to believe that there is intelligent life on another planet in this galaxy? I’d say the evidence is pretty “insufficient”, as in close to zero, as of today. Am I “wrong” to believe (want to believe?) that my one year old granddaughter will someday be really successful as a musician?

I posit he meant it as a joke because he uses “always and for everyone”. Absolutes, like the sign saying “don’t believe anything you read on a sign” usually are meant as humor…

The other, minor thought is that I’d disagree that atheism requires either a belief that theism is harmful or that “there is more to atheism” than just an position that there is no credible evidence to support a belief in a god.

In that section, I was referring to atheism as an activist endeavor, not a position. I’m sorry that wasn’t more clear. I think we are in nearly total, if not total, agreement.

Those who call themselves skeptics sometimes quote W. C. Clifford: “It is wrong, always and for everyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” Unfortunately, Clifford gives no rational hint as to how many pieces of evidence total up to being sufficient.

Furthermore, Popper’s epistemology makes no fetish of either skepticism or faith. I know of no one who practices either wholesale skepticism or wholesale faith. All believers in certain claims are skeptics about rival claims. And all skeptics regarding some claims are believers regarding other claims. All of us, however, have pockets in our lives in which we would be better off if we showed more faith or trust. At the same time, there are pockets in which we would be better off if we trusted less–or at least shifted our faith to something or somebody more trustworthy. Trust and faith, like skepticism, are essential ingredients to human living. Skepticism per se is neither the enemy nor ally of faith per se, for the simple reason that neither exists.

The beauty of Popper’s evolutionary theory of knowledge lies in its insistence that imagination and speculation are essential ingredients of the thinking process. Intuitions become a part of every variety of genuine thinking, including science, because they are accepted as trials rather than dogmas.

Most of our scientific intuitions and conjectures have proved to be unsatisfactory. But Popper argues that some falsified theories have contributed more to the growth of science than have safe, shallow theories that no one has bothered to falsify. Science needs fruitful and falsifiable hypotheses that not only venture into new territory but seemingly go counter to common sense. “Let your hypotheses die for you,” Popper proclaimed. His epistemology is truly liberating, saying in effect that we should not worry about our theories cracking or collapsing because there are always more where they came from.

Creationism and Evolution.
Creationists who insist on classifying their views as “scientific creationism” may not know what they are getting into. Do they really want to assert that creationism is falsifiable? Do they want to try to expose its weaknesses and flaws? Do they seek to correct and revise the doctrine? As is well known, creationists take great delight in pointing out that the theory of evolution is, after all, a theory. But this should pose no problem. All scientific theories are theories. Do creationists want to say that creationism is a theory? Do they want to say that the notion of the Bible as inerrant revelation is a theory?

If Popper’s analysis is correct, then both evolution and creationism are theories. The real question has to do with how well they are articulated, how well they serve to advance further research, and how well they survive rigorous criticism.

The overwhelming majority of biologists and anthropologists have found creationism to be a poor rival to evolution in the attempt to expand our knowledge. Contrary to what some creationists claim, scientists tend to favor evolution as an explanatory theory not because of some presupposition that blinds them to the truth but, rather, because it is scientifically more fruitful than creationism and enjoys greater explanatory power.

Anyway. I guess this is me saying that I should proof my comments better. 😛