I think you’ve missed the point. Thought experiments are not about the choice; they are about the reasons for choosing it. That was the whole point of discussing the study which showed that the answers are not a good measure of moral reasoning, nor are they a good measure of morality (which is separate from moral reasoning because it requires action).

I did not say that I would push the fat man. I did not endorse pushing the fat man. I did not say that one should push the fat man. I noted that pushing the fat man is the utilitarian choice, which is the one considered the most humanitarian by many philosopher’s standards.

You’ve illustrated my point about judging situations and people (in this case, me) using values/emotions/preconceived notions and not the information/evidence as it is presented. So, you’re looking a lot more like a fat man than I, sir.

However, I am not as optimistic as you are about how difficult it is to find skeptics who do not. In fact, many of those who would like to broaden the scope of the movement to include things like progressive liberal ideology seem to me to believe the opposite. And THIS is precisely why I think we butt heads on these things on occasion. If I don’t see more poor reasoning than you, I must notice or remember it more. Perhaps it just bothers me more from years of teaching (or it’s just my personality).

Allow [ethical commitments] to motivate you to set goals [and priorities and to organize with fellow skeptics to mitigate harm]. Then set aside your anger, indignation, ideology, and personal values when you do the work, including the work of setting priorities (you’ve already got a goal that’s derived, in part, from values). It will make you a more open-minded skeptic/scientist. It will make you a better skeptic/scientist.

How can anyone disagree with this? I certainly don’t, and I think you would be hard-pressed to find any skeptic who does.

She can be strongly ethically motivated to do her skepticism — which is the connection between values and skepticism that I endorse — and also remain objective in the application of her method of skepticism (in other words, not fudge results because her ethical ends justify it, etc.). You seem to want me to be saying otherwise so you can argue against that.

Not at all. I don’t want to argue with you; I want to agree with you. However, as I noted in the post:

Regardless of D.J.’s intended message, I feel very strongly that this post sends the wrong message – a message that it’s okay (maybe even important) to allow one’s “moral indignation” to dictate how the work is done.

Objectivity does not “need to be lost” in any case, but is almost always is lost when we do not recognize and separate motivations from process. I don’t think that I am being fuzzy in this regard (I’ve stated several times where I think the demarcation lies), nor am I saying that people should not question their motivations. Quite the opposite. If the motivations for the kind of work that we do are not related to the “moral indignation” that you speak of, I think that they are even more likely to hinder with the work. My understanding is that these are the very conflicts you are trying to rally against and are your motivation for talking about the issue. I am glad that you’re doing so.

What I am saying is that I believe your post (I assume unintentionally) says, “Don’t just keep in mind why you’re doing this; allow that to drive your decisions and actions.”

Furthermore, I disagree with this part of your comment:

But the ethics of skepticism answer the questions Why does the evidence matter regarding this particular paranormal claim? What is the harm in believing nonsense?

Why evidence matters is a matter of logic. What is harmful is a matter of epistemology. Whether or not we take action to prevent harm is a matter of ethics.

It may seem that I am being pedantic, here, but I truly feel that to fail to recognize this is to send the message that values should be a factor in decision-making beyond those of basic goals. I contend that they should not.

Another example (one similar to the story in the beginning) which I think illustrates the problem: at a recent doctor’s visit, I was forced to see a different practitioner because my PCP was unavailable. At the end of the visit, she ordered a mammogram because my last was just over a year ago. When I objected, citing the USPSTF recommendations and reminding her that I am not at risk for breast cancer, she smiled and said, “You can refuse it, but, trust me, I’ve seen it when cancer is not caught early.” Similarly, the Mayo Clinic and ACS have chosen to ignore the new recommendations. In their reasoning, screening results in fewer deaths from breast cancer. In the USPSTF’s reasoning, the risks (which result in some deaths as well as pain and suffering), which include needless biopsies, anxiety, and distress, do not outweigh the benefits. The doctor I saw looked me in the face and worried about the consequences of missing cancer while ignoring or downsizing the consequences of doing the screening. The USPSTF examined the literature and calculated odds; they quantified those consequences and weighed them objectively.

Understanding how humans process information about probability (e.g., base-rate neglect) as well as how values hinder the processing of information in general, I chose to skip the mammogram. It’s a nice package that skipping it also avoids pain on my part and I’m sure that I was unable to separate that particular value from my reasoning process. Nevertheless, recognizing that my desire to avoid pain could taint my reasoning at least allowed me to try to set it aside.

That’s all I’m asking. Allow humanism to motivate you to set goals. Then set aside your anger, indignation, ideology, and personal values when you do the work, including the work of setting priorities (you’ve already got a goal that’s derived, in part, from values). It will make you a more open-minded skeptic/scientist. It will make you a better skeptic/scientist.

To quote myself in the online discussion you cite: “no one is saying humanism and skepticism are the same thing, and we agree that humanism is about much more than skepticism, and vise versa. We agree that they are separate, and ought not be conflated.”

But just because the work of a skeptic is motivated by a sort of righteous indignation at the harm resulting from undue credulity, it doesn’t mean that her objectivity in her research needs to be lost. She can be strongly ethically motivated to do her skepticism — which is the connection between values and skepticism that I endorse — and also remain objective in the application of her method of skepticism (in other words, not fudge results because her ethical ends justify it, etc.). You seem to want me to be saying otherwise so you can argue against that. But that is not my position; indeed I agree with you on this point.

The method of skepticism is continuous with the methods of science: evidence is what matters. But the ethics of skepticism answer the questions Why does the evidence matter regarding this particular paranormal claim? What is the harm in believing nonsense? This is similar to the important set of similar questions in the philosophy of science about what projects merit funding, research, attention. I ‘m not fuzzy on the two, and to make your uncontroversial point, you should avoid being so, too.